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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization
dedicated to addressing the needs and interests of
people aged fifty and older. AARP has a long history
of advocating for access to affordable health care and
for controlling costs without compromising quality.
Affordable prescription medication is particularly
important to the older population which, because of
its higher rates of chronic and serious health
conditions, has the highest rate of prescription drug
use. Persons over sixty-five, although only thirteen
percent of the population, account for thirty-four
percent of all prescriptions dispensed and forty-two
cents of every dollar spent on prescription drugs.
Families USA, Cost Overdose: Growth in Drug
Spending for the Elderly, 1992-2010 at 2 (July 2000).
Significantly, in a 2005 AARP survey, one in four
Americans 50+ who took a prescription drug in the
past five years said they did not fill a prescription
written by their doctor in the past two years. Cost
was reported as the main deterrent. Linda L.
Barrett, Ph.D., AARP, Prescription Drug Use Among
Midlife and Older Americans (2005), available at
assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/rx_midlife_plus.pdf.
Since prescription drug spending has skyrocketed
over the last decade and a half, and national health
In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae
state that: (1) no counsel to a party authored this brief, in
whole or in part; and (2) no person or entity, other than amici,
their members and counsel have made a monetary contribution
to the preparation or submission of this brief. The written
consents of the parties to the filing of this brief have been filed
with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
37.3.

1

2
expenditures on prescription drugs have quadrupled,
AARP advocates for broader access to prescription
drugs and lower prescription drug costs for
consumers. See e.g., AARP, Rx Watchdog Report,
May 2010, available at http://www.aarp.org/health/
drugs-supplements/rx_watchdog.html.
The National Legislative Association on
Prescription Drug Prices is a nonpartisan, nonprofit
organization of state legislators from across the
country who advocate for lowering prescription drug
costs and increasing access to affordable medicines.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should refuse to apply the First
Amendment
to
Vermont’s
Prescription
Confidentiality Law based on two essential facts.
First, the regulation at issue is limited to the
commercial use or private-channel distribution of
confidential data. It is thus governed by cases of this
Court upholding the regulation of uses of
information in purely private settings that do not
inform or contribute to the public sphere. Bartnicki
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-27 n.10 (2001); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985). Second, it concerns the regulation of
secondary uses of information where the government
requires the initial disclosure. It is thus governed by
cases in which this Court has affirmed a right of
governments to restrict access to government held or
mandated information. L.A. Police Dept. v. United
Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). This

3
Court has never held that a regulation at the
intersection of these two lines of cases – where
private channel exchanges and uses of private
(government-mandated) records are at issue – is
First Amendment protected “speech.” Cf. Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). The First Circuit, in a
case parallel to the one before the Court now,
decided the issue correctly – the private-channel use
and trade of prescription records is economic
conduct, not “speech.” IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte,
550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
2864 (2009).
If this law were evaluated as regulating First
Amendment protected speech, such speech should be
given protection commensurate with its “nugatory
informational value.” Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52. In
contrast, this Court should recognize the overriding
interests of Vermont and other states in regulating
the confidentiality of prescription records. The
Vermont law directly advances its interest in
protecting against disclosure of records containing
the most personal of information as well as its
interest in protecting individual autonomy in
decision making on important personal matters.
NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. __ (2011); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977). Protecting the confidentiality of
records advances important goals of our health
system, including combating undue influence of inperson pharmaceutical marketing that raises costs
and damages public health interests. See Ohralik v.
Ohio Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

4
ARGUMENT
I.

DATA MINING COMPANIES LACK A
FREE SPEECH INTEREST IN ACCESS
TO PRESCRIPTION RECORDS.

The ultimate aim of the First Amendment is
to support and promote public speech that creates a
marketplace of ideas and contributes to the creation
of opinions that aid self-government. In furtherance
of this purpose, accurate and non-misleading
commercial speech that informs the public sphere is
deserving of a limited degree of First Amendment
protection. But extension of that protection to the
use of prescription records to target marketing to
doctors is inappropriate for two reasons. First, the
information in this case is never delivered to
consumers or the public sphere and therefore does
not further the informational function the
commercial speech doctrine is meant to serve.
Second, the information Respondents seek to access
and use is not willingly released by the original
holders of the information, but rather is contained in
government mandated records. Vermont’s law to
prevent the closed commercial uses of confidential
information in records it requires the production of
harms no First Amendment protected purpose.
A.

Respondents’ Conduct Does Not
Serve a Public Informational
Function.

The court below erred in applying the exacting
standards reserved for regulation of public
advertising, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.

5
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), to the
closed commercial trade and use of confidential
medical information from prescriptions to target
marketing.
Respondents do not seek a right to disclose
any information in their public advertising. They
seek access to confidential records to track doctors
and patients, not to communicate with them.
Respondents use prescription records as a “targeting
tool” to identify doctors that are most susceptible to
sales messages and to evaluate whether they
respond more positively to different tactics such as
gifts, meals, samples and paid speaker programs.
Pet. Br. at 9. The data allows pinpoint tracking of
prescriptions for 200 million patients so that email
alerts can be sent to a sales representative if a
patient fills a prescription for a competing or generic
drug. Id. at 8-9.2 And the data is used to monitor
sales quotas and compensate sales representatives
for their success at increasing market share on a
physician by physician basis. Id. at 9. None of the
activities communicate with consumers or the
general public and therefore none are speech
protected by the First Amendment.
Modern First Amendment doctrine accords
accurate and non-misleading commercial advertising
a lesser degree of protection to serve an
“informational function.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 563. This function of contributing accurate and
2

As described more fully in Section II, below, patients are
identified and tracked by the records despite their names
having been encrypted.

6
non-misleading information to the public sphere is
valued because of its potential relation to core First
Amendment purposes: “the free flow of commercial
information” may be “indispensable to the formation
of intelligent opinions” necessary for enlightened
“public decision making in a democracy.” Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Credit
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976); see First
Nat’l Bank v. Bollotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (“the
First Amendment goes beyond protection of . . . the
self expression of individuals to prohibit government
from limiting the stock of information from which
members of the public may draw”).
The protection of speech for its information
function is primarily concerned with “public speech.”
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 n. 7. Such speech
contributes to the “free trade in ideas” that Justice
Holmes described as “the best test of truth.” Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). But commercial purchases and uses of
information in purely private commercial settings
contributes few raw materials to the public sphere
while at the same time being less subject to the
cleansing power of the marketplace of ideas. Thus,
the commercial speech doctrine allows more state
regulation designed to thwart potentially misleading
speech the more the communication in question
takes place outside of the light of public debate. See
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct.
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (explaining that
more regulation is permitted of in-person solicitation
than of print advertising because the latter “poses
much less risk of overreaching or undue influence”

7
because it is “more conducive to reflection and the
exercise of choice on the part of the consumer than is
personal solicitation”).
Commercial use of information that does not
communicate with consumers is not speech protected
by the First Amendment. The Court opined in
Ohralik, for instance, that there are “[n]umerous
examples . . . of communications that are regulated
without offending the First Amendment,” listing
several examples of commercial communication not
made to consumers or the public: “the exchange of
information about securities, corporate proxy
statements, the exchange of price and production
information among competitors, and employers'
threats of retaliation for the labor activities of
employees.” 436 U.S. at 456. Similarly, the Court in
Bartnicki distinguished between the section of a law
prohibiting the “naked disclosure” of intercepted
communications, which it held to be “pure speech,”
and the “use” of that same information to chart
commercial strategy or other commercial purposes,
which the court held to be “conduct.” 532 U.S. at 52627. The difference between the disclosure held to be
pure speech and the uses held to be conduct is their
relation to the First Amendment purpose of informing
the public sphere. The development and evaluation of
commercial products and strategies, although they
may be related to and intertwined with public
advertising, are not themselves communication to the
public. The First Amendment does not protect every
activity that may shape a commercial advertising
message – it only protects the message itself. See
Wine and Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. State of Rhode

8
Island, 418 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that
franchise law limitation of corporate relations for
“provision of advertising services” regulated conduct,
not speech).
The regulated activity of Respondents in this
case uses information in ways that neither serve the
public informative interests of the First Amendment,
nor is policed by the open scrutiny of public
examination. The Respondents do not seek a right to
share this information with consumers – either
doctors or patients. Rather they seek a right to use
the information to target marketing. The messages
in targeted marketing appeals deserve more limited
First Amendment protection than those in more
diffused forms of advertising. See Florida Bar v.
Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 630 (1995) (“an
untargeted letter to society at large is different in
kind” from an individually targeted solicitation). But
the use of information to create the targeted lists
themselves deserves no First Amendment protection
at all. See Neil Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy
and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1149,
1165-82, 1190 (2005); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues
of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 Duke L. J. 967 (2004); Julie
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy
and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373,
1414 (2000) (arguing against heightened First
Amendment scrutiny for regulation of the trade of
personal data as “a tool for processing people” rather

9
than as a “vehicle for injecting communication into
the ‘marketplace of ideas’”).3
Respondents go beyond the commercial speech
doctrine, arguing that they are “publishers” that
deserve protection for their activity equivalent to
that due for the Wall Street Journal’s publication of
stock quotes. Resp’t IMS Cert. Br. at 13; IMS Health,
Inc. v. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053, at *6-7,
n.2 (2d. Cir., Nov. 23, 2010). As described in section
I(B) below, even if they were publishers they would
lack a right to access confidential medical records for
their publication activities. But their analogy
obscures a key difference between their activities
and those of public media outlets: the facts
newspapers report, although sold for payment and
profit, are contributions to the public domain.
Copyright law restricts the copying of the expression
itself, but “does not shield any idea or fact contained
in the copyrighted work;” “[a] reader may make full
use of any fact or idea she acquires from her
reading.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 197, 217
(2003) (internal citations omitted). Such reporting,
therefore, contributes information that the wider
public may use for discussion, commentary, and
3

Even critics of the general notion of data privacy laws
generally support laws like Vermont’s that serve the
constitutional value of ensuring a willing speaker by creating
and enforcing implied contracts that certain kinds of data will
not be traded without consent, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of
a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1049, 1057-62 (2000), and placing conditions on the use or
transfer of data that the government holds or requires, id. at
1055.

10
broad circulation. Not so with the prescription
information traded in this case. “Data mining
appellants actually prohibit their customers from
disclosing the data they license to anyone else, much
less the general public.” Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24053 at *67 (Livingston, J. dissenting,
emphasis in the original). The Respondents are not
publishers because they do not deliver their
information in a manner that can ever enter public
discourse. And because they are not publishers, the
higher First Amendment standards applicable to
publishers do not apply. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S.
at 762-63.
It need not be disputed that there are
occasions when “[e]ven dry information, devoid of
advocacy, political relevance, or artistic expression”
may be protected by the First Amendment. Sorrell,
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at *18-19 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). But the use and trade of
such information in entirely private settings, as a
product rather than for any expressive or
communicative purpose, serves no First Amendment
value. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at *6566 (Livingston, J. dissenting). As with the restricted
trade in credit report information at issue in Dun &
Bradstreet, there “is simply no credible argument”
that the trade in prescription drug records “requires
special protection to ensure that debate on public
issues will be uninhibited, robust and wide open.”
472 U.S. at 762; see Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52
(describing the unprotected class of communications
as deriving “from a felt sense that the underlying

11
laws are inoffensive to the core values of the First
Amendment”).
Fundamentally,
the
conduct
of
the
Respondents with the personally identified
information at issue in this case is not speech
because their commercial trade and use of
confidential information is deliberately tailored to
never inform the public sphere.
B.

Prescription Records are Not
Public Information.

The regulated prescription data mining
activities lack First Amendment protection for an
additional reason – the records Respondents seek to
access are not public information.4 Recognition of a
right to access and use information in such records
would force patients and doctors to release
information without their consent and therefore
would implicate the “freedom not to speak publicly.”
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985); see Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n
of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795-98
(1988).
Prescription records would not exist but for
state laws preventing patients from filling
Respondents seek to artificially sever their purchase of the
data from the pharmacies’ acquisition of the data in their role
as government-regulated dispensers of controlled substances.
They dispute that they seek a right “to access” government
mandated records, describing their claim instead as one “to
purchase” them. IMS Cert. Pet. at 20. This appears to be a
distinction without a difference.
4
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without
providing
personal
prescriptions
information. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at
*58 (Livingston, J. dissenting). It is not disputed
that, had the pharmacists and other holders of
prescription records been government entities, there
would be no right of the Respondents to access those
records over government imposed restrictions.
United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 40; see also Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532, 537 (1989)
(although state could not punish public disclosure of
names of rape victims in public records, it could
prohibit the records from being released); Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (affirming no
right to “sources of information under government
control”); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 496 (1975) (states may regulate “exposure of
private information”). Notably, the validity of such
restrictions holds regardless of whether the
recipients at issue are “publishers.” Id. Even the
public media lacks a First Amendment right to
access confidential information from government
records.
The majority in the Second Circuit held that
the outcome is different in this case because the
holders of the information are private entities, not
offices of government. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
24053 at *22-23. But that distinction was rejected in
Seattle Times Co., where the Court upheld a
restriction on the dissemination of information from
one private party to another “pursuant to a court
order that both granted him access to that
information and placed restraints on the way in
which the information might be used.” 467 U.S. at
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32. The Vermont law similarly grants pharmacies
and other health care providers access to
prescription information only with accompanying
restraints on the purposes for which the information
can be used.
The Sorrell majority opinion’s distinction
between the public or private nature of the holder of
government-mandated information would lead to the
absurd consequence of requiring, as a matter of
constitutional
law,
dramatically
different
confidentiality
laws
for
government-required
educational, health, prison and other records
depending on whether the service provider was
public or private. Sorrell, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
24053 at *59-60 (Livingston, J. dissenting). The
relevant distinction is not whether the holder of the
record is part of government but rather whether the
holder, public or private, is a recipient of the
information only by virtue of a government
requirement. Here, pharmacies possess prescription
records because Vermont law requires them as a
condition for accessing essential medical care.
Vermont is therefore free to place secondary
distribution restrictions on those same records.
C.

Respondents’
Theory
Would
Threaten a Complex Web of State
and Federal Personal Information
Privacy Protections.

Respondents’ theory that strict scrutiny is
warranted for any government regulation of the sale
or use of truthful information or that “discriminates”
between the “viewpoint” of commercial marketers
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and other speakers, IMS Cert. Br. at 1, 10, 13, would
threaten a massive amount of regulatory law,
including every information confidentiality law in
the nation.
Every confidentiality protection, from those
protecting grand jury identities to the many rules
foreclosing commercial uses of medical, financial,
and other records, suppress the free flow of true
information. Vermont’s prescription privacy law is
similar to a great body of regulations at every level
of government that restrict secondary uses of
personal information from marketing and other uses.
Such
laws
are
particularly
prevalent
in
telecommunications,
financial
services,
home
entertainment, credit reporting, employment,
medicine, and with respect to government held
information. Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R.
Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of United
States Data Protection 132-34, 229-230, 243-249,
270-273, 292-295, 317-323, 354-55, 370, 1998 Supp.
24-35, 35-45 (1996). See also Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 526-30
(2006); Daniel J. Solove & Paul M. Schwartz,
Information Privacy Law 715-824 (3rd ed. 2008);
Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less, supra, at 97172.
The distinction Vermont’s law makes between
the treatment of commercial marketing and other
uses of prescription data is not unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination. This distinction reflects
this Court’s doctrine and approval of prior
information confidentiality laws. The law is carefully
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tailored to focus its restrictions on the kinds of “uses”
of private information that the Court has identified
as “a regulation of conduct,” while avoiding broad
prohibitions of “disclosure” which the Court has held
to be a regulation of “pure speech.” Bartnicki, 32
U.S. at 527-28. The statute is also constructed to
carefully parallel confidentiality laws previously
upheld by this Court in United Reporting, 528 U.S.
at 35 (allowing government mandated records to be
used for “a scholarly, journalistic, political or
governmental purpose,” but not “used directly or
indirectly to sell a product”) and Reno, 528 U.S. at
148 (upholding under Commerce Clause scrutiny
prohibition of recipients of regulated information from
using it for prohibited purposes, including
“marketing”). Accepting the Respondents’ theory
would call into question these previously approved
laws and the great body of restrictions on the
secondary uses of personal information for
marketing purposes. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(d) (banning use of financial
information for “marketing”).
In addition to striking down a host of current
laws, the Respondents’ proposal would halt the
development of data privacy standards in the U.S. at
a time when they are at their infancy. The entire
field of informational privacy law is relatively new,
dating from the 1970s and the growth of computer
technology. Harry Henderson, Privacy in the
Information Age 117-30 (2006) (listing privacy law
chronology). The current state of the law in the U.S.
is “a complex patchwork of laws and regulations,
administrative decisions, court orders, constitutional
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rights, and state laws,” A.B.A. Privacy & Computer
Crime Comm. Section of Sci. & Tech. Law, Int’l
Guide to Privacy xx (2004), largely focused around
“narrow rights addressing discreet issues.” Schwartz
& Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law, supra, at 215.
There is a sharp contrast between this patchwork of
laws and the modern reality of life that creates a
trail of identifiable data connected to everything we
do and everywhere we go. See Robert O’Harrow, No
Place to Hide
34-73 (2006); see also Sharona
Hoffman and Andy Podgursky, Information Security
of Health Data: Electronic Health Information
Security and Privacy, in Harboring Data:
Information Security, Law and the Corporation
(2009). This state of affairs has led to a vibrant and
active debate in policy spheres as to what the ideal
set of information privacy rights should be in our
modern networked world. See, e.g., Sen. Franken to
Chair New Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology
and
the
Law
(Feb.
14,
2011)
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id
=1315; Daniel J. Solove, The New Vulnerability:
Data Security and Personal Information, in Securing
Privacy in the Internet Age (2008); Daniel J. Solove &
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 357 (2006); Stanford
Law Review Symposium on Information Privacy, 52
Stan. L. Rev. (2000); Mike Hatch, Minn. Attorney
General, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting
Sensitive Personal Information From Commercial
Interests in the 21st Century, 27 Wm. Mitchell L.
Rev. 1458 (2001). A First Amendment right to sell
and use for any purpose any information a company
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transitorily possesses in the course of business would
foreclose this entire debate.
This case does not require the Court to decide
on the First Amendment application to the full range
of data privacy regulations that exist or are being
pondered by the policy-making branches. The facts of
this case deal with the much narrower question of
the ability of governments to regulate the re-use of
highly personal information produced under
governmental disclosure mandates. The Court
should make clear that the First Amendment is not
implicated when, having mandated the disclosure of
medical information, the state protects that
confidential information from non-consensual
marketing uses.
II.

STATES HAVE OVERRIDING
INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PRESCRIPTION
RECORDS.

Ultimately the determination of every First
Amendment case involves the application of a
balancing test and the jurisprudential work is done
in determining the weights due each side of the
scale. As argued above, this case does not fit into any
of the fact patterns that would trigger intermediate
scrutiny under the traditional commercial speech
doctrine. To the extent that any commercial speech
is affected by the law, it must only be afforded
protection “commensurate with its position in
relation
to
other
constitutionally
protected
expression.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
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525, 553 (2001). Here, the effect on the speech is
indirect and it applies only to commercial speech
that takes place in in-person solicitations. See
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641-42. Because Vermont has
carefully tailored its law to regulate only conduct
related to the trade in medical records rather than
any speech, its law should be subject to a rational
basis inquiry. Nonetheless, there is substantial
evidence in the record that the law serves interests
of the highest order. These include the
“Constitutional privacy interest” in safeguarding
personal information in state-mandated records,
NASA, 562 U.S.___ (2011)(Slip op. 1), protecting the
efficacy and efficiency of its public health system
from undue influence of pharmaceutical marketing,
and promoting standards of conduct within the
licensed professions.
A.

Vermont’s Prescription Privacy
Law Directly Advances Its Interest
in Protecting Information Privacy.

Vermont’s law is a medical record
confidentiality law. As such, the core interest it
expresses is one in information privacy. This Court
recently reaffirmed that protecting the privacy of
information in government mandated records is a
constitutional interest of governments. NASA v.
Nelson, 562 U.S. __ (2011)
(Slip op., 19-20).
Although the Court has not expressly held this
interest to be a right protected by the Due Process
Clause, it has clearly affirmed its nature as a highorder justification for state regulation. See id.
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (Slip op. at 1) (affirming
interest of governments “to enact those laws, to

19
shape them, and when they think it is appropriate,
to repeal them”); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06; Nixon
v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-58 (1977).
Vermont directly serves the Court’s articulation of at
least two different kinds of information privacy
interests: one, “the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters;” the other, “the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.5
1.

Vermont Protects Against the
Disclosure of Personal
Matters.

Vermont serves a vital interest in protecting
patients from disclosure of their medical records.
The Respondents claim that there are no patient
privacy interests in the disclosure of prescription
records because patient identities are encrypted at
the pharmacy’s office prior to their transfer to the
data mining and pharmaceutical marketing firms.
See Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 45 (describing encryption
practice). But the encryption of patient names is not
sufficient to guard the patient’s interest against
disclosure of personal matters.
Because medical records contain incredibly
intimate details of personal life, patients have a
strong privacy interest in avoiding their disclosure
For scholarship on the autonomy and dignity interest
underlying informational privacy protections see Solove,
Taxonomy, supra, at 522, Cohen, supra, at 1423-28; Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 753
(1989).
5
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“[e]ven if there were no possibility that a patient’s
identity might be learned.” Northwestern Mem’l
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004).
In this case, it is not true that patient identities
cannot be learned. As the EPIC Amicus Curiae Br.
explains in detail, it is relatively easy to re-identify
records with the amount of information that the
respondents track.
Indeed, the data mining companies do not
meaningfully de-identify the records at all. They
encrypt the name of the patient, but attach to each
an individual identifier to “track the patient over
time.” Pet. Br. at 7. While names are encrypted,
patient identifying numbers are permanent,
allowing information to be linked across multiple
information sources to build incredibly detailed
portraits of individual patients, including the date
and place that every prescription is filled and the
patient’s age and gender. IMS Health, Inc., v.
Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (D. Vt. 2009). IMS
marketing materials display that they are also able
to track the “diagnosis,” “ethnicity,” “address” and
“insurance ID” for millions of patients, which can be
used to monitor individual patient responses to
direct to consumer advertising, “all the while
remaining anonymous to avoid re-identification.”
IMS
Health,
Inc,
LifeLink,
available
at
http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/imshealth/men
uitem.a953aef4d73d1ecd88f611019418c22a/?vgnexto
id=9826f8731739b110VgnVCM100000ed152ca2RCR
D&vgnextfmt=default;
Evaluating
Relationship
Marketing Programs http://www.imshealth.com/
imshealth/Global/Content/Document/LifeLink/Evalu
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ating_Relationship_Marketing_Programs.pdf. Even
without identifying physician names, this level of
detail in the tracking of individuals implicates
patients’ interests in not having their personal
information disclosed.6
The patient interest in avoiding disclosure is
magnified by the linking of patient information with
physician identifiers. Such linking of information
allows pharmaceutical marketers to track individual
patient treatment so that they can respond, to the
patient’s doctor, to any change in that treatment not
in accord with the company’s pecuniary interest. Pet.
Br. at 9. (describing the use of anonymous patient
data to send marketers email alerts for any shift in a
patient’s prescription). The Court should affirm that
protecting against such practices legitimately and
directly advances the constitutional interest in
avoiding medical information disclosures articulated
in Whalen. 429 U.S. 589.
2.

Vermont Protects the
Independence of Prescribing
Decisions.

Vermont’s regulation of the use of prescription
data for marketing purposes serves a second
information privacy interest – that of protecting
“independence in making certain kinds of important
6

Indeed, the level of patient detail tracked by the Respondents
appears to violate HIPAA. 45 C.F.R. §164.502(d)(1) (2006)
(requiring that patient level data be stripped of numerous
personal identifiers, including “subdivisions smaller than a
state” and “all elements of date except year”).
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decisions.” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. This is a
core interest of all medical confidentiality laws. We
protect the confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship because we want medical decisions to be
based solely on the independent judgment of the
doctor about the best interests of the patient.
Prescription tracking for marketing purposes
is designed to influence the independence of
prescribing decisions “to drive profitable brand
growth.” Jim Carroll & Tanya Foniri, Infuse
Anonymized Patient-Level Information into the BrandPlanning Process to Drive Profitable Growth, IMS,
http://www.imshealth.com/vgn/images/portal/cit_4000
0873/0/38/78187147Brand%20Planning%20Paper.pdf.
As described more fully below, the social scientific
evidence is overwhelming that the interests of the
physician-patient relationship and the pecuniary
interest of brand growth are frequently at odds.
Sorrell, 631 F.Supp. 2d at 449-52. The evidence is
also overwhelming that influence of marketing is
intruding on the autonomy of decisions as measured
by adherence to public health clinical guidelines and
objective appraisals of best evidence. Id. Vermont
reasonably concluded that such evidence displays
the presence of undue influence of marketing, which
is increased with access to confidential prescription
records, and which harms the independence of
medical decision making. Responding to such
implications of confidentiality breaches is an interest
of the highest order. Whalen, 429 U.S. 589.
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B.

Vermont Directly Advances Its
Interest in Controlling Undue
Influence and Misleading
Communication in Pharmaceutical
Marketing that Raise Costs, Harm
Health, and Damage Professional
Standards.
1.

Prescription Data Mining
Accelerates and Incentivizes
Undue Influence and
Misleading Marketing.

Respondents claim that Vermont’s law must
be struck down because the legislative findings
express an intention to respond to an information
“marketplace” that “is frequently one-sided” and that
leads “doctors to prescribe drugs based on
incomplete and biased information.” Sorrell, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 24053 at *15 (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). There is some
question as to whether these findings relate to the
data privacy provisions at issue or to a section of the
same law that was later repealed. Amicus Curiae
NEJM Br. But even if accepted as applying to the
challenged law, they do no more than articulate
interests in curbing undue influence and misleading
commercial speech that the Court has long identified
as substantial state interests.
Perhaps the key difference between the First
Amendment’s application to commercial speech
restrictions and that applied to core speech is that in
the former context the state can permissibly take
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prophylactic measures to control communications
that may be misleading or deceptive. Va. Pharmacy
at 772; Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. U.S.,
559 U.S. __ (2010)(Slip op., at 20), Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993); Ohralik., 436 U.S. at 45758; Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, 26-34
(2001). This interest is heightened when the
communication at issue takes place in the dark – in
in-person exchanges, Orhalik, 436 U.S. 447 and
through contracts bound to secrecy, Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749. In such settings, the ability
of the marketplace of ideas to play a cleansing role is
diminished as is the contribution to public discourse
the First Amendment seeks to foster. At the same
time, the opportunity for and potential influence of
misleading information is increased. For this reason,
and particularly where there is evidence of the
occurrence of misleading advertising, the Court has
recognized an interest of governments to combat
“undue influence” through “one-sided” presentations
that “may disserve the individual and societal
interest . . . in facilitating informed and reliable
decision making.” Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58, 461.
These are almost precisely the terms that Vermont
used in its legislative findings.
Vermont’s
legislative
findings
clearly
articulate
the
conclusion
that
in-person
pharmaceutical detailing guided by access to
prescription histories is exerting an undue influence
on doctors by misleading them as to the true costs
and risks of medicines. See S. 115, 2007 Leg. Reg.
Sess. (Vt. 2007) (enacted) (Leg. Finding 4) (data
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mining and detailing “leads to doctors prescribing
drugs based on incomplete and biased information”);
(Leg. Finding 7) (data mining and detailing lead to
an irrational over-prescription of new drugs that “do
not necessarily provide additional benefits over older
drugs, but do add costs and as yet unknown sideeffects.”). The District Court similarly found that the
litigation and legislative history records establish
that prescription data “amplifies the influence and
effectiveness of detailing” at convincing doctors to
shift patients to new treatments that are more
expensive, but not necessarily more effective, than
generic equivalents, and that harm patients through
irrational prescribing and increased risks associated
with newer medicines. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d at
451-54.
The evidence of the occurrence of misleading
speech in pharmaceutical detailing is voluminous.
One can begin with the steady trend toward
increasing criminal convictions and civil fines for
false and misleading marketing. Public Citizen,
Rapidly Increasing Criminal and Civil Monetary
Penalties Against the Pharmaceutical Industry: 1991
to 2010, (Dec. 16, 2010); C. Seth Landefeld and
Michael Steinman, The Neurontin Legacy –
Marketing
through
Misinformation
and
Manipulation, 360 NEJM 103 (2009); Memorandum
from Henry Waxman, to Democratic Members of the
Gov’t Reform Committee, on the Marketing of Vioxx to
Physicians (May 5, 2005). Empirical studies have
shown that a large number (eleven percent) of
observed statements by detailers to doctors were
demonstrably false, but that only twenty six percent of
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doctors could detect these false messages. Ayotte, 550
F.3d at 56, citing Michael Ziegler, et al., The Accuracy
of Drug Information from Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives, 273 JAMA 1296 (1995).7
That such cases are not mere “bad apple”
exceptions is evidenced by the numerous empirical
studies documenting that higher exposure to inperson detailing measurably increases irrational
prescribing behavior as measured by adherence to
clinical guidelines and the best evidence. See David
Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and the
Protection of Patient Interests, 38 J.L. Med. Ethics 74
(2010); Geoffrey Anderson, et al., Newly Approved
Does Not Always Mean New and Improved, 299 JAMA
1598 (2008); Abigail Caplovitz, Turning Medicine Into
Snake Oil: How Pharmaceutical Marketers Put
Patients at Risk, NJPIRG Law & Pol’y Center 5
(2006); David Blumenthal, Doctors and Drug
Companies, 251 NEJM 1885 (2004); Puneet
Manchanda & Elisabeth Hokna, Pharmaceutical
Innovation and Cost, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. &
Ethics 785, 797-808 (2005) (reviewing studies);
Michael Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Economic
Implications of Evidence-Based Prescribing for
Hypertension: Could Better Care Cost Less, 291 JAMA
1850, 1854 (2004); Jerry Avorn, Powerful Medicines
202 (rev. 2005).
A similarly high occurrence of misleading statements has been
observed in pharmaceutical marketing publications. Roberto
Cardarelli, et al., A Cross-Sectional Evidence-Based Review of
Pharmaceutical Promotional Marketing Brochures and Their
Underlying Studies: Is What They Tell Us Important and True?, 7
BMC Fam. Prac. 13 (2006) (finding that the research presented
by sales representatives obscured risk/benefit analysis).
7
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The extent of influence of this marketing can be
further inferred from its frequency and cost. Sorrell,
631 F. Supp. 2d at 442 (finding that “[c]oincident
with
the
phenomenon
of
‘data
mining,’
pharmaceutical industry spending on direct
marketing has increased exponentially”); Ayotte, 550
F.3d at 47 (“the average primary care physician
interacts with no fewer than twenty-eight detailers
each week and the average specialist interacts with
fourteen”); Sorrell, 631 F. Supp.2d at 441 (industry
spends $8 billion a year on direct in-person
marketing to physicians); Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 56
(“The fact that the pharmaceutical industry spends
over $4,000,000,000 annually on detailing bears loud
witness to its efficacy”); Manchanda, supra, at 785
(noting that pharmaceutical industry spends more on
its sales force than any other industry).
Respondents argue that Vermont cannot have
an interest in combating misleading speech and
undue influence in pharmaceutical marketing
because physicians are “highly trained.” IMS Cert.
Pet. at 22. Although the sophistication of the target
of marketing is a valid consideration in assessing the
state’s interest in combating misleading commercial
speech, it is clear that doctors are highly susceptible
to misleading pharmaceutical detailing in its present
setting. Studies show that prescribing doctors
erroneously discount the effects of marketing on
their prescribing habits, Ashley Wazana, Physicians
and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a
Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 375 (2000); Blumenthal, Doctors
and Drug Companies, supra; Michael Steinman, et al.,
Of Principles and Pens: Attitudes and Practices of
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Medicine
Housestaff
Towards
Pharmaceutical
Industry Promotions, 110 Am. J. Med. 551 (2001),
have low awareness of the cost of the medicines they
prescribe, G. Michael Allan, et al., Physician
Awareness of Drug Cost, 4 PLOS Medicine 1486
(2007), generally trust the messages delivered by
detailers, Melissa Fischer et al., Prescribers and
Pharmaceutical Representatives: Why Are We Still
Meeting?, 24 J. Gen. Inter. Med. 795, 797 (2009), and
are very poor at detecting false and misleading
messages within sales pitches. Ziegler, supra, at
1296.
Even if the commercial speech doctrine were
applied, it would not disable Vermont from acting in
response to these clear showings of public need.
2.

Prescription Data Mining
Increases Health Care Costs
and Hurts Patients.

Undue influence by pharmaceutical marketing
results in enormous costs to society that states have
a vital interest in controlling. These costs are
measured not only in dollars, but in the degradation
of public health that flows from increased
prescribing of drugs that are less effective, and
sometimes harmful, to patients.
The Vermont legislation detailed many of
these findings in its law. After documenting the
presence of undue influence of marketing, the
legislature found that these practices come “at the
expense of cost-containment activities,” (Leg.
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Finding 3) and “contribute[] to the strain on health
care budgets for individuals as well as health care
programs”(Leg. Finding 15). These findings are well
supported in the record.
There is little debate that cost care concerns of
states are real and substantial. As the district court
noted, U.S. spending on prescription drugs has been
increasing at higher rates than inflation over the
last decade while the number of prescriptions has
risen far less dramatically. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d
at 449-50, n.12. This evidences the steady shift in
prescribing toward more expensive medicines which,
in turn, is driven by the influence of marketing. Id;
see National Institute for Health Care Management,
Prescription Drug Expenditures in 2001: Another
Year of Escalating Costs (revised May 6, 2002);
NIHCM Foundation, Factors Affecting the Growth of
Prescription Drug Expenditures, (July 1999)
available at http://www.nihcm.org/pdf/
issuebrief.PDF.
There are many examples of the successes of
our super-charged pharmaceutical marketing system
at shifting massive amounts of prescriptions toward
newer, more expensive drugs that do not benefit
patients. One study included in the legislative
history showed that using highly-marketed branded
medicines for high blood pressure instead of less
expensive generic therapies rated as more effective
by national treatment guidelines increased U.S.
health costs by $3 billion in 1996. Robert Cardarelli,
John Licciardone & Lockwood Taylor, A CrossSectional Evidence-Based Review of Pharmaceutical
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Promotional Marketing Brochures and Their
Underlying Studies: Is What They Tell Us Important
and True?, 7 BMC Fam. Prac. 13, 14 (2006). Another
study found that approximately forty percent of
Pennsylvania Medicare patients on antihypertensive
therapy were being prescribed medications at odds
with clinical guidelines at an additional cost of $1.2
billion per year when calculated nationally. Fischer,
supra, 291 JAMA at 1854.
A similar effect can be seen in the incredible
marketing push and resultant prescription surge for
Vioxx, Celebrex, and other COX-2 inhibitors, despite
the lack of any conclusive medical evidence that they
were more effective than older pain medications, or
that the reduction in gastric side effects were
significant for most patients. Harlan Krumholz, et
al., What Have We Learnt From Vioxx?, 334 BMJ
120, 120-123 (2007). And in the case of Vioxx,
aggressive marketing using prescriber data helped
facilitate the widespread adoption of a drug that was
far more dangerous to patient health than existing
alternatives or than the company’s marketing
messages admitted. Id. Overall, the evidence is clear:
after interactions with sales representatives
physicians are more likely to prescribe newer and
more expensive drugs over generic alternatives, even
when the alternative would be as good or better than
the more expensive drug. See Wazana, supra, at 373380.
These undue influences harm public health.
As the district court found, the record demonstrates
that marketing with access to prescription records
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encourages the prescription of newer and
“potentially more dangerous drugs instead of
adhering to evidence-based treatment guidelines.”
Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 453. Cost and public
health concerns are linked. Patients, especially the
poor and elderly, often make choices about which
prescriptions to fill or whether to split pills based on
the affordability of the medication, Becky
Briesacher, et al., Patients At-Risk for Cost-Related
Medication Nonadherence, 22 J. Gen. Internal Med.
864, 864 (2007), which in turn contributes to higher
costs on the health system through increased
hospitalizations and sub-optimal treatment. Michael
Sokol, et al., Impact of Medication Adherence on
Hospitalization Risk and Healthcare Cost, 43 Med.
Care 521, 525-28 (2005).
3.

Physician-Identifiable
Data
Increases Ethical Pitfalls of
Physician-Industry
Interactions.

Vermont’s law also furthers its “special
responsibility for maintaining standards among the
members of licensed professions,” Ohralik, 436 U.S.
at 460, including among physicians and pharmacists.
Prescriber profiling is used to reinforce
pecuniary and other relationships between
physicians and pharmaceutical companies which
threaten the ethical standards of the profession and
jeopardize their relations with patients. See Susan
Chimonas,
et
al.,
Physicians
and
Drug
Representatives: Exploring the Dynamic of the
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Relationship, 22 J. Gen. Intern. Med. 184, 188-89
(2007); Susan Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations,
Part 1, 136 Annals of Internal Med. 396, 400 (2002).
Prescription
histories
allow
marketing
representatives to identify their best and worst
prescribers and tailor rewards or pressure
accordingly. Waxman, supra, at 13 (revealing Merck
graded doctors from A+ to D based on how reliably
they prescribed Merck products); Public Citizen,
Response to FDA Request for Comments on First
Amendment Issues, Sept. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=71
99 (detailing the use of prescription data to reward
doctors for off-label prescribing of Neurontin). Ninetyfour percent of all doctors routinely receive gifts of
significant value, such as meals and free drug
samples. Eric Campbell, et al., A National Survey of
Physician-Industry Relationships, 356 New Eng. J.
Med. 1742, 1742, 1746 (2007). These gifts are guided
by access to prescription data, Carl Elliott, The Drug
Pushers, The Atlantic, 82, 90-91 (Apr. 2006), and
create powerful psychological urges to reciprocate,
Jason Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social Science
Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290
JAMA 252, 253 (2003); Dana Katz, et al., All Gifts
Large and Small, 3 Am. J. Bioethics 39, 39-41 (2003).
Physicians whose prescribing behavior is especially
favorable to companies may receive tens, even
hundreds of thousands of dollars for consultancies
and lectures each year. Adriane Fugh-Berman &
Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug
Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLoS
Med e150 (2007); Joseph Ross, et al., Pharmaceutical
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Company Payments to Physicians, 297 JAMA 1216,
1219-20 (2007).
This perversion of the pecuniary incentives in
medical care debases the medical profession and, as
the practice becomes more public, breaks the chain
of trust between doctor and patient. Robert Gibbons,
et al., A Comparison of Physicians’ and Patients’
Attitudes Toward Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts, 13 J.
Gen. Internal Med. 151, 152-53 (1998); Gardiner
Harris & Robert Pear, Drug Maker’s Efforts to
Compete in Lucrative Insulin Market are Under
Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2006. Vermont has a
vital interest in setting high standards in the medical
professions that ensure patient trust and ethical
dealing by health care providers, including by
ensuring medical record confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully
urge that the judgment below be reversed.
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